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PREFACE 
A question of considerable interest in assessing long-term energy 
options involves whether the burning of carbon, particularly the plentiful 
resources of coal, will continue to increase at a fairly rapid rate. If so, 
the level of carbon dioxide (C02) in the atmosphere may rise substan- 
tially, perhaps doubling around the middle of the next century. It is 
widely believed that such an increase would gradually lead to a signifi- 
cantly different climate, probably one warmer than the earth has experi- 
enced for roughly 100,000 years, and to important consequences for the 
economy and environment. 
What are the likely societal responses to t h s  prospect? Will nations 
try to prevent or reduce such change? Will they choose to accept the 
change and seek adaptive measures? During the past year an effort has 
been underway jointly betwaen IIASA's Resources and Environment (REN) 
and Management and Technology (MMT) areas to explore the various pol- 
icy options through a gaming approach. 
Ths Working Paper is the fifth describing the research. "Carbon and 
Climate Gaming" (J. Ausubel, J. Lathrop, I .  Stahl, and J.  Robinson, WP-BO- 
152) offers the basic arguments in favor of a gaming approach and out- 
lines briefly the two proposed games. "COZ8 An Introduction and Possible 
Board Game" (J. Ausubel, WP-80-153) sketches the CO issue in non- 
technical terms, describes the objectives and a possib?e design for a 
board game, and includes a tentative listing of spaces for the game. "An 
Interactive Model for Determining Coal Costs for a C02:Game" ( 1  Stahl. 
WP-80-154) explains reasons for emphasizing coal mining, combustion, 
and world coal trade in the C 0 2  gaming, and presents a model which 
begins the incorporation of the coal economy into a more complex 
computer-based game. "A Framework for Scenario Generation for C02 
ABSTRACT 
Previous estimates of input of fossil fuel C02 into the atmosphere are 
reviewed, including those of NAS, IIASA, IEA, and Marchetti. Methods 
employed largely disregard that if COZ-induced changes are indeed harm- 
ful then there may be efforts to prevent emissions. There is a need to 
include explicitly societal response to increasing C02 emissions in 
estimating future input as well as the strategic interaction among 
national energy policies. Economic theory of the general equilibrium 
type, game theory, and computer simulation (without humans) have 
disadvantages in this regard. Gaming, involving humans playing the roles 
of various nations, may be an illuminating approach to the problem. A 
simple game, focusing on coal, trade, and many nations is proposed as an 
initial effort. 
Gaming" (J. Robinson and J. Ausubel, WP-81-34) develops a framework for 
the generation of integrated scenarios of carbon use and climatic impacts 
in the computer-based game and for strengthening the design of the 
board in the board game. It also begins the elaboration of the events 
which are an important basis for C02 scenarios. This Working Paper 
further develops arguments on how the proposed computer-based game 
may improve estimates of future input of fossil fuel C02 into the atmo- 
sphere. 
The carbon and climate gaming effort has benefitted greatly from 
comments from people who have read the various working papers and 
played the early versions of the board game. The research is still evolving, 
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ESTIMATING THE FUTURE INPUT 
OF F'OSSIL FUEL CO INTO THE ATMOSPHERE 
BY SIMULATION G ~ I N G  
Ingolf Stahl and Jesse Ausubel 
1. PREVIOUS ESTIMATES 
A question of fundamental importance in evaluating the carbon diox- 
ide issue is how much C02 is likely to be put into the atmosphere from 
burning of fossil fuels over the next 50 to 100 years. A wide range of esti- 
mates has been offered. Whle the numbers have varied a great deal, 
there has been a similarity of approaches. 
Often the approach is simply to take the current level of fossil fuel 
combustion and multiply it by an assumed constant rate of change. Rotty 
(1977) estimated that historically C02 emissions from fossil fuel burning 
and cement manufacture have increased 4.3% per year except for periods 
of the two world wars and the global economic depression of the early 
1930s. Th.m figure of 4.3% has commonly been used to project future lev- 
els of atmospheric C02. For example, a JASON report (1979) opens with 
the statement, "If the current growth rate in the use of fossil fuels contin- 
ues a t  4.3% per year, then the CO concentration in the atmosphere can 
be expected to double by about 2055 ..." 
While the 4.3% figure seems to have been the one most often dis- 
cussed in the literature (Munn and Machta, 1978; World Climate Pro- 
gramme, 1981), arguments are, of course, made for estimates on both 
sides of this number. At the low extreme, one finds the projections of 
Lovins (1980). With a slight decrease of use of fossil fuels, a CO "prob- 
lem" never comes about. With a zero growth rate, a doubling of atmos- 
pheric C02 is estimated to occur in 2119, almost 140 years from now. At 
the h g h  ex-treme, one finds the 50 terawatt (TW) global energy scenario 
proposed as a limiting case by Niehaus (1979). T h s  scenario analyses the 
consequences for atmospheric C02 if all of a hlgh projected energy 
demand is covered by fossil fuels. 
Most energy scenarios lie in between and project a continued growth 
of energy demand to  between 20 TW and 35 TW over the next 50 years. 
(Estimated global primary energy supply in 1975 was about 8 TW (IIASA, 
1981).) These include scenarios developed for studies by the US National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS), the International Institute for Applied Sys- 
tems Analysis (IIASA), and the Institute for Energy Analysis (IEA). When- 
ever these scenarios do not project a large share of nonfossil energy, they 
lead to relatively serious concerns about climatic change in the next 50 
to 100 years. Let us briefly examine the character of these projections 
which are the basis of much of the concern about COZ. 
1.1. NAS 
Perry and Landsberg (NAS, 1977) project world energy consumption 
and emissions to the year 2025. The projections are for 11 geographic 
regions, whch are sometimes large nations and sometimes aggregates of 
nations, based on estimates of the supply of energy resources of various 
kinds and energy demand. Demand is derived from projections of popula- 
tion, GNP, and the relationship of GNP per capita and energy consump- 
tion. Energy resources produced in a region are used to  supply regional 
demand to the extent that production has been estimated to be able to 
meet demand. 
Emissions are calculated for two situations. On the one hand, if 
regional demand exceeds regional production, an estimate is made 
assuming a new renewable, nonpolluting energy resource would be avail- 
able to meet the deficiency of nonrewable resources. On the other hand, 
an estimate is made for the situation where regional deficiency would be 
met by coal, the fuel in greatest supply. Based on these assumptions, 
annual world C02 emissions in 2025 would be about 14 gigatons of carbon 
(Gt C) in the first case and about 27 Gt C in the second case, or about 3 to 
6 times current levels. There is no feedback between environmental 
change and energy strategy, other than the possibility of being on one or 
another path a t  the outset. 
1.2. IlASA 
The IIASA Energy Program (Niehaus and Williams, 1979; IIASA, 1981) 
analyzed several hypothetical energy strategies for the period up to the 
year 2100 for their implications for atmospheric CO Distribution of 2.' 
energy supply among coal, oil, gas, solar, and nuclear is derived from a 
global energy model developed by Voss (1977). This model is structured 
into six sectors: population, energy, resources, industrial production, 
capital, and the environment. There is no geographic disaggregation. 
Proportions of fossil fuels used are determined by the Voss model, with 
some additional consideration of available resources. 
Among the scenarios explored (Niehaus and Williams, 1979) are four 
in which global demand levels out to either 30 TW or 50 TW in 2100. In 
both the lower and higher demand cases there is an analysis in which 
nuclear and solar energy play an important role and in which they do not. 
Table 1 shows the reserves of fossil fue1.s used in each strategy. 
T a b l e  1. R e s e r v e s  o f  f o s s i l  f u e l s  u s e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g i e s .  
S t r a t e g y  C o a l  O i l  G a s  
G t  C G t  C G t  C 
- 
30 TW w i t h  solar a n d  n u c l e a r  1 7 0  170  1 1 0  
50 TW w i t h  s o l a r  a n d  n u c l e a r  2 3 0  210  1 3 0  
30 TW f o s s i l  f u e l  1980  1 9 0  120  
50 TW f o s s i l  f u e l  3020  2 3 0  140  
SOURCE: A f t e r  N i e h a u s  a n d  W i l l i a m s  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
The scenarios with reliance on nuclear and solar energy lead to peak 
C02 emissions of less than 10 Gt C per year, whle the scenarios with reli- 
ance on fossil fuels lead to emissions of about 22 Gt C and 30 Gt C in 2025, 
increasing somewhat thereafter. Whle consideration is given to available 
fossil resources at the global level, no more detailed study is undertaken. 
As in the NAS study, the only feedback between CO,Z-induced environmen- 
tal  change and energy strategy is the one impllcit in choice between 
paths a t  the outset. 
1.3. IEA 
For several years, Rotty and co-workers a t  IEA (Rotty, 1977, 1978, 
1979a; Marland and Rotty, 1979) emphasized extrapolation of figures in 
the vicinity of the 4.3% estimate of historic annual increase in C 0 2  emis- 
sions. Based on demand and fuel share projections made for six world 
.regions, an annual fossil fuel release of C 0 2  containing 23 Gt C for 2025 is 
calculated. Arbitrary global fossil resource usage rates are applied for 
very long term tests of sensitivity of atmospheric concentrations. 
A more recent paper (Rotty and Marland, 1980) begins to evaluate 
constraints on fossil fuel use. Three kinds of constraints are  discussed: 
resource, environmental, and fuel demand. With respect to the resource 
constraint, Rotty and Marland (1980) conclude that the fraction of total 
resources already used is so small that physical quantities cannot yet be 
perceived as presenting a real constraint. However, it  is mentioned that 
unequal geographic distribution of the resources probably will continue to 
be a source of international stress. Climatic change as an environmental 
issue is also dismissed as a constraint to fossil fuel use. "Although global 
warming of about 1'C to 1.5'C over a 50-year time span is enough to cause 
concern among climatologists, i t  is probably not enough'to cause a revi- 
sion in policy of fossil fuel use -- especially a t  the beginning of the 50-year 
period, and when fossil fuels play a major role in the global economy." 
Arguments other than the  uncertainty about possible costs of climatic 
change are not presented to back t h s  conclusion. 
In contrast, Rotty and Marland (1980) discuss a t  some length that  
slower growth in fuel demand dictated by social and economic factors will 
limit fossil fuel use. Reduced economic growth is projected as a result of 
problems with capital and escalating costs and shifts toward conservation 
and less energy intensive industries. It is unclear whether international 
stress and threat of environmental change are themselves elements in 
causing the reduction in demand. In any case, summing up estimates for 
about a dozen countries and half a dozen aggregate regions results in a 
C 0 2  release in 2025 of about 14 G t  C ,  an annual growth ra te  of 2% per year 
over the current level. 
1.4. Marchetti 
One other projection, employing a quite different logic, must be men- 
tioned. Marchetti (1900) has made a forecast of the amount of C02 which 
will be emitted to the year 2050 based on a logistic substitution model of 
energy systems (Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979). This model treats  
energies as technologies competing for a market and applies a form of 
market penetration analysis. A logistic function is used for describing the 
evolution of energy sources and is fitted to historical statistical data.  The 
driving force for change in this model appears to be the geographical 
density of energy consumption, and the mechanisms leading to the switch 
from one source to another are the different economies of scale associ- 
ated with each energy source. The approach downplays the causal impor- 
tance of resource availability, political arguments, and prices. 
With data on energy consumption back to 1660 and including both 
commercial and noncommercial (wood, farm waste, hay) energy sources, 
the slope of the fitted curve of energy demand implies a n  annual growth 
of 2.3% . (This contrasts with Rotty (1979b) who finds that  commercial 
energy supply, excepting times of world conflicts and depression, has 
grown a t  a rate of about 5.3% since 1860.) Applying a future growth rate of 
3%, Marchetti calculates energy consumption for the  various sources for 
the period 1975-2050 based on the logistic equations. The model predicts 
a relatively rapid phaseout of coal, a quite important role for natural gas, 
and over the next 50 years a negligible role for new sources other than 
nuclear. The model predicts a cumulative increase in atmospheric car- 
bon to  the year 2050 of about 400 Gt, a n  amount below most other esti- 
mates, as well as  a gradual reduction in atmospheric C 0 2  thereafter. 
2. COWARING THE SCENARIOS 
Comparison of the scenarios shows ;ome features in common. Most 
prominent is an assumption that virtually all easily accessible oil and gas 
will be consumed. This assumption is difficult to argue with; the timing 
may be a point of contention, but  these sources seem too attractive to  
remain underground. 
However, the  scenarios differ considerably, some suggesting an  
annual emission in 2025 of less than 10 Gt and others suggesting as much 
as 30 Gt. Since the scenarios differ so much, certain questions begin to 
arise. Is there some way to  choose among them? Which is more likely? 
Is there a way to improve or bound the estimates generally? One way of 
choosing among the scenarios would clearly be to select on the basis of 
other assumptions, for example, about overall population or economic 
growth. Similarly, arguments can be made about lifestyle change or 
technical efficiency. 
One perhaps more researchable means of both evaluating the 
scenarios and improving future forecasts may be to look for internal con- 
sistency. Do the various levels of emissions presuppose plausible pat- 
terns of international trade? Are they based upon distributions of natural 
resources which are  in line with current estimates? Do they violate 
notions of national behavior? 
2.1. A General Deficiency 
The estimates above have a general deficiency when applied to 
analysis of the CO issue. These are projections in which the estimates of 
ejected CO are a most incidental; if the C02. issue is indeed trivial, then B f the  estima es may be consistent. However, lf the issue is more serious, 
than the method of estimation needs to take into account the changing 
level of C 0 2  itself. That is, there is a need for feedback between environ- 
mental change and energy use. 
If the emission of C 0 2  is harmful in the long run for certain coun- 
tries, possibly for many countries, then at  some time interest in prevent- 
ing C 0 2  emissions will rise. Indeed, suppose that it becomes reasonably 
certain during the next one to three decades, either through results of 
more extensive research or by an  actually experienced minor change in 
climate, that  the effects of C02 emissions will be strongly negative for at  
least some countries. What would be the likelihood of reducing emis- 
sions? What forms of control might be feasible? What will be the effect of 
prevention efforts on emissions? 
Focusing on this aspect of the issue indicates that a forecast of C02 
emissions should not be a description of a mechanistic process but an  
analysis of the  interaction between actual or perceived effects of C02 and 
the actions taken by various decision makers. Human decision makers 
largely determine how much C 0 2  is added to natural sources and 
released to the atmosphere. In theory a t  least, governments and peoples 
could make the issue dissolve by deciding to  reduce significantly the 
burning of carbon. I t  is  their perception of the consequences of C 0 2  emis- 
sions as well as their interaction with each other that  will determine the 
decisions and thus the amount of C02 emitted. 
The question of C 0 2  emissions should not be regarded as only a 
technical one, but rather as one involving societal responses, where deci- 
sion makers are a central focus. By focusing on the  decision making 
processes and the  effect of information on these processes, one can also 
hope to  advance discussion of other important questions. For example, 
can we wait to take preventive action on C 0 2  until we know with certainty 
about the effects of C02? Is the time lag among perceived effects, 
decisions, and adjustments so long that recommendations for action 
should be given quite soon? 
3. WAYS TO STUDY SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO THE C02 ISSUE 
Having established the reason for studying societal responses to the 
CO issue, the question becomes what research strategy may shed light 
on ? he problem. 
3.1. Do Not Study at All 
The first possible answer is not to study the question a t  all. Many 
would stress the enormous complexity and long time perspective, imply- 
ing that all findings would be uselessly hypothetical. Others would say, 
continue to leave the problem entirely as a concern of'physical scientists. 
We do not, however, subscribe to these attitudes. That a problem is diffi- 
cult, complex, and long-term does not mean that research will have no 
value. If the question is potentially important, serious attempts to 
explore it are worthwhile from several points of view. It is evident that we 
will not come up with correct predictions about what will happen half a 
century from now. However, we may make substantial progress over the 
scant picture currently available. And, by attempting better descriptions 
now, we may be able to develop useful means for organizing information 
so that as time evolves one can give gradually better and better answers. 
Moreover, having a more reliable forecast 5 or 10 years from today of 
impending climatic change will be of little value, if we have not made pro- 
gress in analysing societies' concerns about and responses to  climatic 
change. 
Another group would say that a t  the present time it is simply 
unnecessary to worry about a long-term issue like COZ. Before it becomes 
an acute problem, technological innovations like the "glga-mixer" (Mar- 
chetti, 1977) will take care of it. We are not certain that such a techno- 
logically optimistic view is justified. We by no means rule out the possibil- 
ity of such solutions, but the probability of the absence of such solutions 
is large enough that thinking about a world with increasing CO2 in the 
atmosphere is an important research task. 
Hence we proceed with looking for concrete proposals on how to 
study societal responses to the prospect of h g h  levels of burning of car- 
b on. 
3.2. Optimization 
One approach is that  of optimization, searchng for the best possible 
outcome of exploitation of carbon and climatic resources. In simplest 
terms, one makes some best estimate of the impact of CO and climatic 
change on economic activities and maximizes the presen? value of the 
benefits of burning carbon and the costs and benefits of the impacts 
caused by resulting levels of COZ in the atmosphere. Nordhaus (1979) has 
tried to  determine an optimal path for the whole world. to follow in burn- 
ing of carbon with respect to the potential. effects of C02 on the environ- 
ment and economy. 
There is a considerable problem with this approach. Global optimiza- 
tion implicitly assumes the existence of some kind of single benevolent 
world ruler, an entity capable of implementing the policies whch the glo- 
bal objective function suggests. While we do not know the geopolitical con- 
figuration of the 21st century, t h s  appears to be an unrealistic assump- 
tion, or at least an extreme one. It seems more likely that the world, 
even as integration and interdependence increase, will continue to con- 
sist of many sovereign states. Indeed, our major working hypothesis is 
that in the future there will be many independent nations, often having 
conflicting aims in regard to factors which form the C 0 2  issue, particu- 
larly energy policy. 
3.3. Game Theory 
To advance our understanding of the likely evolution of the C02 ques- 
tion, it appears to be of fundamental importance to develop an analysis 
which can portray dynamically the conflict potentially inherent in the 
situation. Hence, we turn to the theory and playing of games, and the 
analysis of a situation involving conflicting interests in terms of gains and 
losses among opposing players. The conflict situation embodies a t  least 
two different kinds of games. 
3.3.1. The "Tragedy of the Commons" Game. 
One way of seeing the CO issue is as a long term game involving a 
tragedy of the commons (Har 5 in, 1968), where the potential tragedy is 
use of the atmospheric common for waste disposal to the extent that  a 
catastrophic change of climate takes place. For the sake of simplicity of 
exposition, this game can be represented as a kind of "Prisoners' 
Dilemma" (Rapoport 1974), with interaction between two players or 
nations. In the C 0 2  case, each nation regards itself as small, with its 
actions having a m n o r  effect on climate, and regards other nations as 
one big nation, "the outer world," with a large effect on global climate. 
If we let nations A and B represent many nations in the eyes of the 
other party, the game can be studied in the form of a simple matrix. The 
numbers in the matrix imply a ranking of the outcomes for each player. A 
player prefers an outcome with as high a number as possible, that is, a 
payoff of 4 is best and a payoff of 1 is worst. 
We look more closely a t  the matrix, starting with A's decision. Recall 
that A sees B as a big player. If A believes that B will burn, then A will 
think that the climate will be ruined anyway in the long run, regardless of 
whether he himself will burn. A faces a choice between an outcome of 2 
for burning and 1 for not burning, and A will then burn and get the short 
term benefits of burning. 
Alternatively, suppose that A believes that B will not burn. Since A 
regards himself to be small and hence only a marginal factor in the cli- 
mate, tn.en A will still burn. In this way A achieves his best outcome, 4, 
with the benefits of both burning and essential conservation of the cli- 
mate. A prefers the short term benefits of burning to marginally affect- 
ing the climate in a beneficial way. 
Table 2 .  P r i s o n e r s '  Dilemma G a m e .  
Burn 
Not  Burn 
k5 
 urn ~ o t  Burn 
Since we assume that B has a similar view of the world, in t h s  sym- 
metric game the same decisions will be made by B. Each party will burn 
regardless of what he thinks that  the other party will do. Hence, they will 
together reach the outcome 2,2 in spite of the fact that they would both 
prefer the result 3,3,  that is, that  no one burns. 
'lhs is the general problem of the tragedy of the commons. If the 
players were committed to pursuing a strategy of cooperation, in this 
case of not burning, everyone would be better off. If possibilities of form- 
ing binding agreements or establishing mutual trust are lacking, then 
each party will act contrary to the common interest. (See Godwin and 
Shepard, 1980, for a discussion of the influence of specific incentive 
structures on the outcome of commons dilemmas.) 
An advantage of presenting the commons problem in the Prisoners' 
Dilemma format is that it focuses on the question of whether legally bind- 
ing or morally committing agreements on not burning can be reached. 
Furthermore, it helps relate the analysis to the extensive experimental 
gaming work done on the Prisoners' Dilemma. (See, for example, Guyer 
and Perkel, 1972.) These advantages should outwegh the argument (see 
Dasgupta and Heal, 1979) that the Commons problem is not formally 
equivalent to the many player version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game in 
the sense that the strategies of the equilibrium solution are not generally 
formed by dominating strategies. 
3.3.2. A Game of Opposing Interests. 
While the Tragedy of the Commons (Prisoners' Dilemma) game deals 
with the longer term problem of a catastrophic change of the climate, for 
example, in the form of a sea level rise induced by collapse of of the West 
Antarctic ice sheet, there is another game situation arising from impacts 
obtainable in a shorter time perspective, perhaps within a few decades. It 
seems quite likely that already at  a global average warming of l ' C ,  consid- 
erable changes in agricultural conditions would be experienced. (See 
Flohn, 1980.) Such changes could well be beneficial for some regions and 
adverse for others. 
As a hypothetical case, let us follow Gribbin (1981), who suggests the 
possibility that a global warming might lead in general to problems for 
areas producing wheat and corn, while improving prospects in rice grow- 
ing areas. Such a scenario might hold if findings about warming being 
associated with drier conditions in middle and h g h  latitudes (Manabe and 
Wetherald, 1980) turn out to be correct. If one looks a t  the situation from 
a global perspective and regards population as completely mobile, one 
might well find that the deteriorated conditions in some areas are offset 
by improved conditions in other areas. However, one must recognize that 
many attach a high negative value to large scale population movements. 
If one assumes limitations on or great costs of both internal and interna- 
tional migration, then the situation becomes one of opposing interests 
between players, that  is, regions or nations. 
Returning to our hypothetical case, a rice player may prefer burning 
of carbon, not only "domestically," but also elsewhere, since it may lead 
to a more favorable climate. A wheat player, in contrast, will not only 
dislike the burning carried out by others, but might even find his own 
burning detrimental, i f  he is a large enough player. This example leads to 
a matrix like the one in Table 3. In order to emphasize the difference 
from the Prisoners' Dilemma matrix described earlier, we here assume 
that the player Wheat is relatively large. In this matrix we see that Rice 
prefers the situation when both burn carbon, while Wheat prefers the 
situation when nobody burns. The result will be that Rice burns, while 
Wheat does not burn. 
Table 3 could very well have other forms. The important point is that 
in the medium term (that is with a time horizon before a catastrophic 
possibility the C 0 2  issue may have a different character than in the long 
term. In particular, in the shorter perspective some parties might actu- 
ally prefer a higher level of COZ,in the atmosphere. Both game situations 
described here and other plausible ones, involving, for example, distribu- 
tion of benefits from direct CO "fertilization" of plants or opening of arc- 
tic transport routes, stress th&. it is important to have an analysis of the 
C 0 2  issue that focuses on the fact that different countries have different 
perceptions regarding the character of a C02-induced warming and vari- 
ous societal responses may be warranted. 
T a b l e  3 .  G a m e  o f  o p p o s i n g  i n t e r e s t s .  
Wheat 




4. STUDYING THE GAME SITUATION 
Having established that  the CO issue involves a game situation, the 
more specific question of how to stu 3 y such a situation arises. In particu- 
lar, focusing on the first kind of game problem, that  of the Tragedy of the 
Commons, how does one begin to explore if there will be some agreement 
on international cooperation to limit carbon burning and if in the absence 
of such agreements a tragedy will occur. 
4.1. Economic Theory 
One possible approach would be to employ economic theory of the 
general equilibrium type. We would then assume the existence of a great 
many, small, independently acting countries. This assumption in itself, 
however, implies the answer the analysis would give. With each nation 
acting independently, cooperation would not take place. The basic 
assumption precludes analysis of strategic interdependence existing 
betwe en various nations. 
It should be stressed that  it is by no means without interest to  carry 
out this type of economic analysis. It may provide an extreme value for 
what could happen if there is no cooperation at  all. One might then come 
to understand better  how serious a "tragedy" could result from the total 
absence of cooperation. 
4.2. Game Theory 
To incorporate considerations of interdependence among nations, we 
turn to  game theory, which focuses on strategic relationships between 
rational actors. (Rationality generally implies that each actor is maxim- 
izing his individual utility and has correct expectations about the other 
actors.) Broadly speaking, game theory can be divided in two categories, 
cooperative theory and noncooperative theory. (See, for example, 
Bacharach, 1976.) 
Cooperative theory implies that  the parties first find and decide on a 
jointly optimal strategy and then proceed (if side-payments are allowed) 
to divide the jointly optimal result. Much of cooperative theory consists 
of schemes for dividing the results. Cooperative theory could thus build 
on the global optimization model of Nordhaus and examine the question 
of how to share the  results of a non-tragedy outcome. In contrast, non- 
cooperative theory does not allow any commitment to agreements. As in 
the Prisoners' Dilemma situation presented above and traditional 
economic theory, an  outcome with no cooperation, most likely leading to 
a tragedy, is obtained. A critical problem for exploring the C 0 2  question 
is which body of game theory to  apply, cooperative or noncooperative, 
when the reality might lie between the results produced by the two 
extremes of complete cooperation and complete lack of cooperation. 
There is little higher level theory helping to identify which of these 
two main bodies of theory is appropriate. The little theory there is indi- 
cates that  the total number of players is one factor of importance for 
determining whether stable cooperation is feasible or not. The fewer the  
players are, the more likely one is to get some cooperative agreement on 
a set  of jointly optimal strategies. This has been shown mainly for games 
with players of equal size. The idea is that  belonging to a cartel is advan- 
tageous, but that  in certain cases i t  will be more advantageous to be a 
party outside of the cartel, when all other parties are in the cartel. In 
some very simple games, with players of equal size, simple demand and 
cost functions, and complete information, the critical number of players 
has been shown to be around 4 to 6. (Selten, 1973; see also Guyer and 
Cross, 1980, p. 131.) In games where there are players of different sizes 
and complex demand and cost functions and a dynamically evolving state 
of information for the players, the aid which game theory can provide in 
estimating the outcome is quite limited. 
4.3. Simulation 
Realizing the complexity of the  C02 situation, we next consider using 
computer simulation, not involving humans as players. The advantage of 
computer simulation is that  it allows complexity in cost and demand con- 
ditions, as well as  stochastic characteristics regarding the state of 
nature. Furthermore, in contrast to game theory, one is not required to 
assume complete rationality and correct expectations by the actors. 
Finally, computer simulation models can be run a great number of times, 
testing how sensitive results are to changes in various parameters. 
There is, however, a major obstacle to direct use of this type of com- 
puter  simulation for studying Lhe C02 issue. We do not know how to 
specify the equations representing the behavior of the nations to be 
represented. For example, how will a large country respond when some 
smaller country starts  to defect from an  agreement? Will it also defect to 
punish the other country? Or, will i t  continue to play cooperatively for 
awhile, hoping to bring the other country back to  cooperation? Whether 
we get stable international cooperation or a tragedy of the commons can 
depend largely on how these behavioral equations are specified. 
It has been shown in other game situations that it is difficult to for- 
mulate behavioral equations for players without studying first the actual 
behavior of human players in several runs of a game. Even for a game as 
simple as the Prisoners' Dilemma played many times in a row, it has been 
difficult to construct reasonable simulation models without using infor- 
mation from a great many actual gaming experiments. (See Stahl, 1975.) 
4.4. Gaming 
Gaming, the playing of games involving several humans, appears to 
be a method well-placed for gaining insights into the CO question. (See 
Shubik. 1875 and 1980, for baslc discussion of gaming.y It is a method 
which has been used with success for a variety of problems, for example, 
in the military and in business, in countries with different economic sys- 
tems. (Brewer and Shubik, 1979; Marshev, 1981) While maintaining 
several of the advantages of simulation and game theory, it overcomes 
the problem of performing a simulation without a behavioral basis. By 
involving human players in the game, we can observe hunan  responses in 
specific situations and begin to learn about the critical variable, namely 
the propensity of humans in t b s  situation to build trust and to respond to 
noncooperation. In the exploration of societal responses to the C02 issue, 
gaming thus would seem logically to precede simulation without humans. 
While gaming appears to have certain advantages as a research tool for 
the CO question, it also has benefits from the points of view of education 
and cozlection of information (Ausubel and others. 1980; Stahl. 1980; 
Robinson and Ausubel, 1981). 
Several objections can also be raised to the use of gaming. These 
center on the the question of whether a game played by a small number 
of players in an "experimental" setting in a short time can have any vali- 
dity as regards a long-term problem of enormous complexity. 
It must be stressed first that gaming can give only extremely tenta- 
tive answers and that we see gaming as an appropriate method for our 
problem, not in an absolute sense, but in a relative sense as compared to 
other methods. With respect to the specific game proposed in this paper, 
we believe there are ways to respond to some of the most common criti- 
cisms of the methodology of gaming. These objections include the follow- 
ing. 
[ I ]  The relationshp between the "level" of the actor in reality and the 
player in the game. The classic example of t h s  problem in the gam- 
ing literature is the American college student playing the role of the 
Chinese foreign minister. The problem for the CO game is probably 
less drastic. Given the international character of ~ I A S A ,  it should be 
possible to have players from most of the nations covered in the 
game. Secondly,players will include both scientists in the energy 
field and people from government and industry, who, although not on 
the top decision level, have a good feeling for the real decision mak- 
ing process. In t h s  regard experience with a IlASA regional water 
cost allocation game played with water and regional planners in Bul- 
garia, Italy, Poland, and Sweden is encouraging (Stahl and oth- 
ers,l981). It should be mentioned that the positive experience in 
obtaining qualified participants is due to a great extent to the fact 
that the gaming experiments are designed to be completed in about 
three hours, or a single evening. The C02 game is being designed to 
be similarly attractive from the point of mew of desirable players. 
[Z] The relationship between how a certain person would behave in real- 
ity and how he would behave in a game. How seriously does a person 
behave when playing in a game? In this respect we are again hopeful 
based upon experience with the water game. The fact that water 
planners in several quite different countries played in a similar 
manner (different from how students in these countries played) indi- 
cates that their playlng was not random, but rather reflected careful 
professional thinking. 
[3] The relationship between the real decision environment, for example, 
with respect to resources, technological development, and changing 
scientific information, and how this is covered by the institutional 
assumptions of the game. Clearly, there will be a tremendous 
discrepancy. We believe, however, that the game can still be used as 
an acid test for various hypotheses and theoretical models about the 
decision process. These hypotheses or models are generally built on 
a t  least as simplified a set of institutional set of assumptions as the 
game. If the players do not behave according to the model in the 
simple game with an institutional set up of the same simplicity as the 
model, they are not likely to behave according to the model in the 
more complicated reality either. The gaming should at the least be 
helpful in indicating what kind of hypotheses and models one should 
devote more research to. 
5. MAIN CHARACTmSTICS OF THE PROPOSED GAME 
While several games based on the C02 situation could be envisaged, 
the game under development focuses on the question of how much carbon 
may be burnt, as more information becomes available regarding the 
environmental and economic impacts of COZ The main structure of the 
game can be characterized in brief by coal, trade, and many countries. 
5.1. Why Coal? 
The sine qua n o n  of a severe C02-induced climate problem seems to 
be the burning of coal. 
We here take a doubling of atmospheric CO as a level which warrants 
considerable concern. This choice is quite argitrary. Both greater and 
lesser increases could have very costly -- or beneficial -- consequences. 
However, an increase of 50%, which might be associated with a degree of 
warming similar to the Me&eval warm phase 1000 years ago, seems on 
the conservative side, while placing a threshold as high as a tripling defin- 
itely seems imprudent, given possibilities for changes of sea level and so 
forth (Flohn, 1980). 
As shown in Table 4, current estimates of total reserves and 
resources of oil, gas, coal, and other forms of carbon indicate that a dou- 
bling of the present level of atmospheric carbon dioxide withn the next 
50 to 100 years will only be reached with substantial burning of coal. Even 
allowing for the considerable uncertainty of these estimates, it comes 
Table 4. Potentially available carbon resources. 
Best current Upper limit 
estimates speculation 




Ultimately recoverable 140 
conventional natural 9as1 
Ultimately recoverable 3500 
conventional coal3 
Unconventional oil and hundreds of thousands of 
gas2 ~t ~t 
Biospheric (forests, etc. ) 3 - -200 
SOURCE: 1) Rounded from Rotty and Marland (1980); 2) See 
IIASA (1981), Rotty and Marland (1980) ; 3) Cumulative 
release in high deforestation scenario (Chan and 
others, 1980) . 
across strongly that  non-coal carbon resources are not large or accessi- 
ble enough to be exploited to a degree that is highly threatening from a 
CO perspective. Total oil and gas resources, even with the addition of 
hig% rates of deforestation, amount to only about half the 1500 gigatons 
of carbon (Gt C) roughly necessary for a doubling, given present models 
of the carbon cycle (NAS, 1977; Bolin and others, 1979). It should be  noted 
that  some estimates of unconventional gas and oil resources, especially 
oil shale, are quite large (Rotty and Marland, 1980). However, exploitation 
of these resources on a scale whch  could be significant for C02 seems 
unlikely for until well past the year 2000 (Sundquist and Miller, 1980; 
IIASA, 1981). In contrast,  coal could readily account for two-thirds or 
more of CO emissions in a scenario of doubling in the early to  middle 
decades of ?he next century (Marland and Rotty. 1980; Ausubel. 1980). 
Moreover, the extremely desirable characteristics of oil and gas make 
their exploitation appear less "optional" than exploitation of coal. 
Because coal plays t h s  indispensable role in the  C02 issue, it is logical to  
begin game development with the emphasis on coal. 
5.2. Why Trade? 
Why the game explicitly deals with trade in coal is evident from Table 
5, which shows the approximate distribution of coal reserves and 
resources. 
Table 5. Approximate world d i s t r i b u t i o n  of c o a l  r e sou rces  
( i n  g iga tons  carbon) . 
Huge ho ld ings  Large Holdings Small Holdings 
USSR 3300 A u s t r a l i a  180 
U.S. 1700 FRG 170 




I n d i a  4 0  
South Af r i ca  4 0  
Czechoslovakia 1 2  
Yugoslavia 7 




Z imbabwe 5 
Mexico 4 
Swaziland 3 
C h i l e  3 
Indones ia  2 
Hungary 2 
Turkey 2 
Nether lands  2 
France 2 
Spain 2 





SOURCE : Based on d a t a  from World Energy Conference (1978) .  
Very rough e s t i m a t e  of carbon wea l th  i n  G t  has been 
ob ta ined  by mul t i p ly ing  c o a l  r e sou rces  i n  10"ons 
c o a l  e q u i v a l e n t  by carbon f r a c t i o n  of 2/3. 
More than four-fifths of the resources are held by three countries, the 
USSR, US, and Cbna  (henceforth regarded as "big" players). The total 
holdings of the remaining countries, including a few gigatons for coun- 
tries with holdings smaller than one gigaton, amount to  around 800-900 
gigatons, or somewhat more than half the carbon base required for a dou- 
bling. As it is unlikely that  a major part of this will be used within the 
next few generations, it seems reasonably assured that a serious C 0 2  
problem will arise only with substantial use of the coal resources of the 
three b ~ g  players. If these big players do not export large amounts of coal 
and also keep their own coal combustion low, a severe C02 problem 
should not arise. The C02 issue arises in scenarios, like the  ones proposed 
in the World Coal Study (WOCOL, 1980), where over the next 20 years 
roughly a ten-fold increase in steam coal trade is envisaged (from 60 mil- 
lion tons in 1977 to 680 million tons in 2000). Coal trade could become 
important for coal consumption in the way that oil trade is today for oil 
consumption. Without a substantial world coal t rade,  the physical quanti- 
ties of carbon required for a C02 problem are  unlikely to be used. 
Trade in coal is also of importance for the estimation of future coal 
usage from another point of view. Coal usage will depend partly on the 
price of coal. Although total consumption of energy in the short run is 
fairly insensitive to price, consumption of a specific energy source in the 
long run will be sensitive to  the price of the resource, since in the long 
run there a re  possibilities of substitution between various sources of 
energy. (See, for example, Nordhaus, 1977.) The extent to which there 
can be substitution between coal and other sources of energy is a major 
aspect of the C 0 2  question, and our working hypothesis is that reasonably 
good possibilities of substitution exist. The price of coal traded on world 
markets thus becomes important for coal usage. If a country either has 
to import or can export coal, then the world market price of coal will 
influence the country's consumption of coal. 
We foresee a world market price of coal, much in the same way as 
one talks today about a world market price of oil, not only in the market  
economies but also in the socialist countries. Three broad levels of coal 
prices can be envisaged. 
[ I ]  A cost based price. Price would be close to long term average costs 
of marginal producers. This price is compatible with the idea that 
the coal market  is characterized by pure competition, that  is, a 
market with a great many sellers. This resembles the  oil price situa- 
tion prior to  1973. 
[2] Monopoly price. The price would maximize the joint result of the 
producers. The sellers forming a cartel would be better  coordinated 
than the buyers. T h s  is a situation similar to that  of oil prices since 
1973. For reasonable values of price elasticity, this would imply a 
price several times higher than marginal costs. (Let us, for example, 
assume that price elasticity E = 1.5, implying that a lowering of price 
by 10 per cent will increase long term usage by 15 per cent. Maxim- 
izing profits, that is, setting marginal revenue equal to  marginal 
costs, we would then have p = E * MC / (E-1) = 1.5MC / 0.5 = 3MC, or 
a price three times marginal cost.) 
[3] A price above monopoly price. Such a price could reflect concern for 
the environmental effects of coal, in particular a C 0 2  problem. On 
top of the ordinary price, there would be a tax to  lower the consump- 
tion of coal t o  that level which is optimal if the cost of coal also 
includes the costs caused by the C 0 2  effects on climate. This price is 
thus a kind of shadow price. A s  pointed out by Nordhaus (1979) such 
a "carbon tax" could become quite high, especially a t  the time when 
the C 0 2  level in the atmosphere has gone up. ( Such a price can of 
course also be below the monopoly price, but always above the cost 
based price, if the environmental effects of C02 are not so strong or 
immediately felt.) 
Which kind of price prevails will be established largely by trade structure, 
that is, by the number and relative strengths of the exporters and 
importers. 
Trade in coal is also of interest in connection with different schemes 
of international cooperation for reducing or preventing CO emissions. 
The possibility for the larger countries to limit the supplies o? coal either 
on the world market generally or to specific countries can give teeth to 
attempts at enforcing international agreements to limit the usage of coal. 
5.3. Why Many Countries? 
The basic reason for inclusion of more than a very few nations is that 
the C 0 2  issue in reality concerns a world where many nations, able to act 
with some independence from one another, affect the problem. If we 
limit ourselves to only a handful of actors in all phases of development of 
the game, certain scenarios would be excluded where international 
cooperation is impeded by the actions of relatively small nations. This 
kind of possibility is also the-reason that it is not appropriate to deal with 
aggregate energy regions, likely to contain several countries with quite 
different characteristics from the point of view of the C 0 2  issue. Of 
course, it is also not necessary to represent every nation in order to cap- 
ture the essence of the C02 issue. 
Whch nations or kinds of nations are critical? Obviously, the three 
big players are of great importance. At the same time, a major portion of 
energy consumption will be taking place outside these countries. Large 
future users of energy like Japan, Brazil, and ltaly are among the nations 
with relatively small holdings of coal, and the behavior of such potentially 
large importers will be of interest. Players whch can affect cartel effi- 
ciency are also of great significance. Even if the three big players 
account for around 80 per cent of total coal resources, the resources of 
some smaller holders are large from an absolute point of view. As Table 5 
shows, another eight countries have substantial holdings, holdings 
currently estimated a t  more than 40 Gt. 40 Gt corresponds roughly to 
total global carbon emissions during the past decade. Such players can 
affect cartel efficiency. 
Furthermore, there are some countries, although neither large coal 
consumers nor producers, that are important due to the fact that a 
severe C02 problem would be particularly imposing for them. For exam- 
ple, collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet and ensuing rise of the world 
oceans (Schneider and Chen, 1980) could constitute a true catastrophe 
for low-lying countries like the Netherlands and Bangladesh. 
Whle the "reality" of the situation is one reason to include more than 
just a few players, the other major reason is that answers to the question 
about likehood of cooperation are dependent on the number of players 
involved in the game. For example, with only three players cooperation in 
the game is quite likely. As mentioned earlier, in some very simple 
games with all players of equal size 4-6 seems to be the boundary between 
few and many. In games with players of different sizes the boundary will 
probably lie hgher .  
Ultimately one would probably wish to include about twenty coun- 
tries of different sizes and characteristics to catch fully the strategic 
problem. While the roles of only seven or eight countries would be played 
by human players, the remaining dozen nations would be played by com- 
puter programs, "robots." (See Ausubel and others, 1980.) 
5.4. General Structure of the Game 
The initial design of the game is oriented toward what may happen a 
generation from now, if there is confirmation of a CO -induced global 8 .  
warming. With the decades around 2010 - 2020 as cr~tlcal ,  the game 
needs to  cover a period of half a century and possibly longer. There will 
be up to about 10 rounds of decision, each representing 5 or 10 years. 
Since the game should be playable in roughly three hours, the number of 
decisions in each 15-20 minute round must be strictly limited. 
The general structure of the game is shown by Fig. 1. 
' i- _ - - - - - -  -1 DECISION +MAKERS 1 
I 1  
EFFECTS - ABOUT 
physical EFFECTS 
+ societal 
C O ~ - L  IM~TATI ON 
AGREEMENT 
- - - - -  DECIS IONS 
EFFECTS 
_ . _ _ - - - -  I 
- INFORMATION 
F i g u r e  1. Main s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  game. 
Decisions are represented by dashed lines extending from the decision 
makers. Each player will have four principle decisions in a round. 
[ I ]  An extraction decision: How much coal shall be mined? 
[2] A trade decision: How much coal shall be demanded or supplied on 
the world market a t  various prices? 
[3] A burning decision: How much coal shall be combusted? 
[4] A decision on C02-limitation: How much shall one pay in order to get 
other nations to  agree on burning less coal? 
Extraction, burning and trade decisions will have monetary conse- 
quences, while the burning decision also will have effects on climate. The 
welfare of the player is influenced by both these shorter term monetary 
effects and the longer term climatic effects of C02. Players will base 
their decisions not only on information about their own economic welfare, 
but also on information about mining, trade, and coal burning by other 
players and information which will develop gradually over time about 
actual and anticipated C02 effects. (For more information on game 
design see Ausubel and others, 1980; Stahl, 1980; Robinson and Ausubel, 
lQ8l . )  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In the beginning of the paper various estimates for the input of fossil 
fuel CO into the atmosphere were presented. These estimates may well 
be ina$equate, since the methods underlying them do not take into 
account societal responses that C02-induced changes may bring about. 
Experiment a1 gaming, focusing on development of international coal 
trade, may provide an approach which overcomes some of the deficien- 
cies of other methods. On the basis of designing and playing a C02 ,and 
coal game with experts in energy and other fields, one should be ln a 
better position to evaluate previous estimates of future C02 emissions 
and improve on these estimates. 
Of course, one should not look to gaming for an authoritative fore- 
cast; the uncertainties inherent in the C02 issue will continue to mean 
that there is a fragile foundation to all forecasts. Rather, the application 
of simulation gaming to this problem should be seen as part of the neces- 
sary contribution of many disciplines and methodologies to the building 
up of a satisfactory assessment of the C 0 2  issue. 
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